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We present the results from a repeat survey on wage rigidity in a sample of 159 
Swedish firms, conducted during a prolonged period of very high unemployment 
and very low inflation. We document the virtual absence of wage cuts, and trace this 
pervasive nominal rigidity to a set of interacting factors, including the legal status of 
the wage contract, the structure of bargaining institutions, and the design of social 
insurance. But employees’ concerns about fairness and relative wages also appear to 
play an important role. In addition, we report new results on underbidding, 
efficiency wage mechanisms, and unemployment persistence. 
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Wage rigidity has been a recurrent theme among economists during the 
twentieth century. An interesting episode is the inter-war years, when Britain’s labor 
market was in a depressed state. Despite high unemployment and a tight monetary 
policy to reduce prices, nominal wages were slow to fall. In the Committee of 
Economists,
1 appointed by the government in 1930, Lionel Robbins argued that 
unions, unemployment insurance, and certain restrictive practices had an important 
role in preventing wage cuts. Arthur Pigou suggested that a main problem lay in a 
geographical mismatch between jobs and job-seekers, aggravated by unemployment 
insurance. The chairman, John Maynard Keynes, appeared to take the position that 
wage rigidity was a social fact of life, related to workers’ concerns about justice and 
relative income, that institutional reform could do little about.  
Although seventy years later several theories and econometric studies deal 
with issues of wage rigidity and unemployment, one can hardly claim that the 
profession has reached an agreement on the substantive mechanisms. In search for 
more evidence, some economists have recently embarked on an unorthodox research 
program, which attempts to evaluate theories by asking questions to the people that 
actually set wages.
2 These field surveys provide useful insights, but they have all been 
conducted under stable macroeconomic conditions, and aimed at a cross-section of 
firms. As a consequence, they provide little information about the anatomy of wage 
rigidity during a severe and prolonged recession.  
                                                        
1 For an account of the proceedings of the Committee of economists, see Moggridge [1992, Ch. 19].  
2 This small literature includes the works of Kaufman [1984], Blinder and Choi [1990], Agell and 
Lundborg [1995], Bewley [1995, 1998], and Campbell and Kamlani [1997]. Kaufman [1984] 
interviews a small sample of managers in non-unionized firms in London, Wales, and the West 
Midlands. Blinder and Choi [1990] approach 19 firms in New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania. Agell 
and Lundborg [1995] survey compensation executives and managers in 179 firms in Swedish 
manufacturing. Bewley [1995,1998] interviews managers and labor leaders in 258 firms in the 
Northeast of the United States, while Campbell and Kamlani [1997] survey 184 firms, most of which 




Our novel twist is that we do it twice, during two years of highly different 
macroeconomic conditions. We thus report the results from a panel survey of wage 
setting and other work practices in a sample of 157 identical firms in Swedish 
manufacturing, carried out in 1991 and 1998. As our second survey was preceded by 
an extended period of high unemployment, and very low inflation, we are provided 
with a unique opportunity to explore how persistent labor market slack and a move 
from high to low inflation affect wage rigidity. Moreover, by comparing our results 
for the unionized and regulated Swedish labor market to those obtained in recent U.S. 
field surveys we can assess the role of country specific institutions.  
We document the virtual absence of nominal wage cuts during several 
consecutive years characterized by very high unemployment and almost no inflation. 
We trace this pervasive nominal rigidity to a set of interacting factors, some of which 
reflect the influence of European-style labor market laws, bargaining institutions and 
social insurance systems. But unlike recent U.S. field surveys, we also find substantial 
evidence in support of the idea of Keynes [1936, p. 14] that employees’ concerns 
about relative wages reinforce nominal rigidity. We trace these conflicting results to 
the fact that most Swedes belong to a union, and that unions can be expected to 
disseminate information about relative pay in other parts of the economy.  
The sharp increase in Swedish unemployment also allows us to evaluate some 
specific theories of effort and unemployment dynamics. We report substantial 
evidence that the increase in unemployment has boosted effort, and reduced 
substandard performance, as predicted by efficiency wage theory. But we were 
surprised to learn that so many managers responded that essentially psychological 
tools – like being appreciative, or demonstrating that they trusted their employees – 




nonmaterial factors is not easy to reconcile with standard neoclassical models, but it 
appears to corroborate some conjectures put forth in recent work on “psychological” 
game theory. Finally, the results of Blanchard and Wolfers [1999] suggest that the 
interaction between aggregate shocks and labor market institutions, like job security 
legislation, may explain high and persistent unemployment in Europe. Our panel 
evidence allows us to shed microeconomic light on the issue.  
 
II. Macroeconomic environment, sample and survey design 
When we conducted our first survey in the fall of 1991, the Swedish economy 
was headed for the most severe economic downturn since the 1930s. Throughout the 
postwar period, until 1990, unemployment never exceeded 4 percent. Between 1991 
and 1993, however, GDP fell by more than five percent, and total unemployment 
(including those enrolled in labor market programs) increased from almost 4 percent 
to almost 13 percent of the work force.
3 The rate of job destruction was particularly 
pronounced in manufacturing; between 1990 and 1993 the number of employees in 
manufacturing decreased by 22 percent. By the time we re-interviewed our firms in 
late 1998 unemployment remained high; more than 10 percent of the workforce was 
still unemployed, or enrolled in a labor market program. 
From the early 1970s to the early 1990s Swedish inflation (as measured by the 
CPI) hovered between five and twelve percent. The sharp increase in unemployment 
brought about a rapid end to the period of high inflation. Inflation decelerated from 
above 10 percent in 1991, down to 2.4 percent in 1994. In the five year period 
preceding our second survey, average inflation was 1.4 percent, and during each of 
                                                        
3 For discussions of the origin and nature of the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s, see Calmfors 




the years 1996-98 inflation was below one percent. In 1998 the year-to-year inflation 
rate was even negative for five consecutive months.  
In our view this extended period of low inflation and slack activity makes our 
panel survey ideally suited for an analysis of nominal wage rigidity. By contrast some 
recent studies of nominal rigidity have relied on data for periods when inflation is 
fairly high, and the activity level has fluctuated within the normal interval. Under 
such macroeconomic circumstances, it is hard to think of any country where nominal 
wage cuts ought to be common. Thus, there is an obvious risk that such studies 
overstate the downward rigidity of nominal wages.
4  
In our 1991 survey 179 firms participated, and when we updated our address 
register in 1998, it turned out that nine of these had closed down operation.
5 The 
remaining 170 firms constitute the population for our repeat survey. After three 
written reminders (that contained copies of the questionnaire), and a final reminder on 
phone, we obtained replies from 157 firms, which implies a very high response rate of 
92.3 percent. Below, when we make comparisons across surveys, we confine attention 
to this balanced sample, where we have two observations for each firm.  
Our overriding objective in designing the 1998 questionnaire was to obtain 
comparability over time. In most instances, we simply re-cycled the old questions. We 
maintained the standard of requiring respondents to indicate the likelihood or 
frequency of various events on an integer scale from 1 to 9, with 1 indicating that a 
certain event is most unlikely, and 9 that it is very likely. We also maintained some 
                                                        
4 For an elaboration of this point, see the comment of Gordon [1997] on the well-known paper by 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry [1997] on nominal wage rigidity in the United States. 
5 We based our first 1991 survey on an address register compiled by the Swedish Association of 
Industries, designed to provide a balanced coverage of the manufacturing sector. In 1991 the register 
included 300 firms, employing approximately 40 percent of all employees in manufacturing. Of these 
firms, 179 responded to our first survey, implying a response rate of 59.7 percent. This sample is 
dominated by large firms; in 1991 the average number of employees was 1 154. It is also dominated by 




questions of an open-ended nature, asking respondents to provide a short answer in 
their own words. In other instances, we made some slight changes in the original 
phrasing of the questions, either because factual developments made modifications 
necessary, or because we judged the old phrasing to be somewhat clumsy.
6 In both 
1991 and 1998 the field work was conducted in November and December.  
 
III. The nominal wage floor 
In 1991 we did not find it worthwhile to ask firms whether they had 
experienced episodes of money wage cuts. Because Swedish unemployment used to 
be very low, and inflation quite high, and because of the collective nature of Swedish 
wage bargaining institutions, we considered nominal wage cuts as a theoretical 
peculiarity, of little practical relevance. However, in 1998 we were curious to see 
whether the new situation of high unemployment, and practically zero inflation, had 
created an environment that was more conducive to wage cuts. Specifically, we asked 
firms whether they at any time during the 1990s, covering a period of 5-6 years of 
very low inflation and high unemployment, had reduced nominal wages.  
Out of 153 responding firms, only two had experienced money wage cuts. For 
those two firms the wage cuts can hardly be classified as very extensive (the 
following information was obtained in phone conversations). In one firm, with several 
hundred employees, two office clerks got reduced pay as they were re-assigned to less 
qualified duties. As part of a general revision of its pay system, the other firm (a 
window-manufacturer in southern Sweden) re-negotiated and lowered the piece rates 
                                                                                                                                                               
industry. The average unionization rate is 92 percent, and the average share of white collar workers is 
35.7 percent. For more detail on survey and sample design, see Agell and Lundborg [1993, 1995]. 
6 As we judged it instrumental to obtain a high response rate we went to great length to design the 
1998-questionnaire in a way that made it easy to respond to. The second survey is more limited in 
scope than the first one, and it contains less information about background variables. For example, we 




for less than ten percent of its employees. In our view, the virtual absence of nominal 
wage cuts among firms that had a total of 187 000 employees in 1991, is prima facie 
evidence that it may take more than several years of very high unemployment and 
very low inflation to create a hole in the nominal wage floor.
7  
To probe deeper we asked managers a number of questions on the sources of 
rigid money wages. In both years we were interested to learn how managers assessed 
their employees’ resistance to wage cuts. For this purpose we asked the following: 
 
Assume that the management in the midst of an acute crisis suggests an 
identical percentage wage cut for all employees in your firm, so that the wage 
hierarchy is retained. What share of the jobs do you believe must be at stake if 
the proposed cut is to be accepted? 
 
It goes without saying that it might be difficult to come up with a very well-informed 
answer to this hypothetical question.
8 It seems reasonable to conjecture that many 
managers provided us with their gut reactions, rather than a reasoned response. Even 
so, a gut reaction can be quite revealing.  
The responses shown in Table 1 suggest that subjectively perceived wage 
rigidity is intense and prevalent, and that the move to a macroeconomic environment 
of high unemployment and very low inflation has done little to soften wage cut 
resistance. In both 1991 and 1998 a large majority of managers believed that a 
proposal to cut pay to save jobs would be strongly resisted. In both years an 
overwhelming majority of managers thought that more than 50 percent of the jobs 
must be at risk if their employees are to accept a proposal to cut pay. These responses 
can be contrasted to the natural idea, often put forth in the union literature, that wage 
                                                        
7 For a comparison with the United States, one may note that Blinder and Choi [1990, p. 1005] report 
that five of their 19 firms recently had cut wages. However, when interviewing 409 employed persons 
in the Washington DC area in 1995, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry [1996] report that only seven had 




reductions ought to occur when the job of the median employee is at risk; i.e. a shock 
that threatens the jobs of exactly 50 percent of the workforce would be enough to 
make the local union accept a pay cut. 
There are many ways of rationalizing downward rigidity of money wages. As 
we discuss below, we believe that four factors are particularly promising in explaining 
nominal wage rigidity: (i) the legal and bargaining framework that surrounds the wage 
contract; (ii) reservation wages and the level and generosity of welfare state 
institutions; (iii) employees’ concerns over relative wages; (iv) the seemingly peculiar 
pattern of wage competition from the unemployed.  
 
A. Legal and bargaining framework.  
Like in many countries Swedish employers are not allowed to cut nominal 
wages in a unilateral manner. This is so also in a situation when the old wage contract 
has expired; the old contract prevails until the parties have reached a new agreement.
9 
But even if a majority of employees, acting via the local union, agrees to accept a new 
wage contract which prescribes reduced pay, it is not obvious that the new contract 
can be implemented. The consent from the local union is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, requirement for a pay cut.  
  First, for employees covered by collective union contracts, the union wage 
contract is included in the individual wage contract. Even if a local union agrees to 
reduce the money wage specified in the union contract, individual union members 
must give their consent to change the individual contract before the wage cut can be 
expedited. Second, many employees have their wages set in a two-tier bargaining 
system, where industry level negotiations precede local level negotiations. The 
                                                                                                                                                               
8 Indeed, a few managers complained that they judged the question to be too speculative. But the great 




(minimum) wage levels specified in the industry level agreement defines a floor, 
which must not be undercut by the local wage agreement. This reduces the magnitude 
of local level pay cuts; see e.g. Holden [1998] for further analysis. 
 
B. Net replacement rates and resistance to wage cuts.  
The combination of – by U.S. standards – quite generous unemployment 
insurance and various income dependent taxes and social benefits implies that the net 
income reduction from job loss is relatively modest for many Swedes. Because of the 
social insurance provided by the welfare state, one may reasonably conjecture that 
employees become more prone to reject proposals to cut pay than would otherwise 
have been the case. The background information that we have gathered allows us to 
test one implication of this hypothesis: because the net replacement rate in case of job 
loss is higher for blue collar workers than for white collar workers, resistance to cut 
pay ought to be stronger in firms with a larger share of blue collar workers.
10  
This pattern is indeed what we find. In our 1991 survey, consisting of 179 
responding firms, we have information about firms’ employment structure. We divide 
these 179 firms in two groups, according to subjectively perceived resistance to pay 
cuts, as reported in Table 1. We assign the number 1 to firms where wage cut 
resistance is very high (in the sense that wage cuts will never be accepted, or accepted 
in case of a shock which threatens all jobs), and the number 0 to firms where wage cut 
                                                                                                                                                               
9 See Holden [1994] for an analysis of how “holdout” can lead to nominal wage rigidity. 
10 Swedish unemployment insurance offers a compensation rate of 80 percent of previous earnings, up 
to a maximum amount. This cap is of no importance for blue collar workers, but implies that most 
white collar workers have lower effective compensation rates. An indication of the magnitudes 
involved is provided by micro-simulations reported by the Swedish Ministry of Finance [1997, p. 108]. 
In these simulations people in work are assumed to become unemployed, and their net replacement rate 
(NRR) is calculated, allowing for the impact of income dependent taxes and welfare provisions 
(including benefits, housing allowances and social assistance). The average NRR for an employed 
Swede is 78 percent. For an average blue collar worker NRR is 79 percent, while NRR is 72 percent for 




resistance is less intense. We then estimate probit models for the probability that a 
firm belong to the group where wage cut resistance is very high.  
In the estimated equations firms’ share of white collar workers have the 
expected negative sign, see Table 2. On average, managers in firms with a large share 
of white collar workers are more confident that their employees would accept a 
proposal to cut pay to avoid major redundancies. The white collar variable remains 
negatively significant when we add a set of industry dummy variables (column 2), and 
a measure of firm size (column 3) to the regression. As white collar workers are less 
unionized than blue collar workers, and because unionization might have an 
independent effect on wage cut resistance, we also run a regression where we include 
the unionization rate among the explanatory variables (column 4). The white collar 
variable remains negative, but the significance level drops to six percent.  
This evidence is clearly of an indirect nature, and there are probably 
alternative ways of rationalizing a negative partial correlation between wage cut 
resistance and the share of white collar workers. Our regressions do suggest, however, 
that there is no easy way of dismissing the natural idea that the safety net of the 
welfare state contributes to the downward rigidity of money wages.  
 
C. Employees’ concerns over relative wages. 
A classic explanation for nominal wage rigidity is the argument of Keynes 
[1936, p. 14] that workers care about relative wages. Because of this they oppose 
money wage cuts, unless wages can be cut in a coordinated manner throughout the 
economy, so as to maintain wage relativities. But if such interpersonal comparisons 
are to explain more than a trivial amount of rigidity, they should reasonably extend 




that employees mainly care about the wage structure within firms. Campbell and 
Kamlani [1997, p. 780] found that notions of fair pay depend on workers’ own past 
wages, firm’s profits, and wages of other workers in the same firm. Bewley [1998, p. 
485] argues that Keynes’s relative wage theory is off the mark, since workers in the 
firms he approached had ”…little systematic knowledge of pay rates at other firms.”  
Our Swedish evidence, in contrast, indicates that employees pay great 
attention to the wage distribution both within and across firms. In 1991 there was 
much consensus among managers that their employees cared as much about external 
wage relations as about internal ones, see Table 3. Blue collar workers compared 
wages both within and across establishments, while white-collar workers put a 
relatively greater emphasis on the inter-firm wage structure.
11 In 1998 we found that 
inter-firm wage comparisons have got more common among white collar workers, 
and somewhat less common among blue collar workers. Thus, to the extent that wage 
rigidity is due to external wage comparisons, there is no ground to conclude that it has 
got less pronounced during Sweden’s move from low to high unemployment. Further 
support for this conclusion is provided by the responses we obtained when we directly 
asked about the plausibility of Keynes’s theory of nominal wage rigidity; see Table 4. 
In 1991 managers’ support was lukewarm – in 1998 more than 40 percent responded 
that they viewed the theory as important or very important.
12  
                                                        
11 Our result that employees care about external wages is not in itself a strong indication of any 
particular labor market model. It is even consistent with a competitive model. In a basically competitive 
labor market the way to infer the going wage is to look at wages payable in other firms before quitting a 
firm that pays a non-competitive wage. We would then expect external wage comparisons to be more 
common in low-wage firms than in high-wage firms. This does not fit the facts. External wage 
comparisons are common in all firms. Another finding is that the standard of comparison seems to 
extend beyond other groups of employees. Many managers responded, as did those interviewed by 
Campbell and Kamlani [1997], that employees pushed for higher wages in times of high profits. 
12 For comparison, one may note that when we asked managers to assess the relevance of the well-
known insider-outsider model in 1991, only 7.7 percent replied that they viewed the theory as 
important or very important; for further details, see Agell and Lundborg [1995]. It is tempting to 
speculate that the increased support for Keynes's relative wage theory between surveys is due to the 
fact that inflation had been low for several years when we asked the question in 1998. When we asked 




  What can explain the greater role of inter-firm wage comparisons in Swedish 
field surveys? No doubt, institutions play a role. Union coverage is very high in our 
firms, ranging from 60 to 100 percent, while Bewley [1998] and Campbell and 
Kamlani [1997] interview managers in firms with little or no union coverage. Since 
unions can be expected to disseminate information about pay and pay scales across 
firms, and across industries, this is likely to make a difference. Bewley [1998, p. 485] 
describes his non-union firms as “isolated islands,” where workers know little about 
pay in other locations. In Sweden, local unions have ample access to data on wage 
structure and wage changes throughout the country.  
From this perspective one may argue that Keynes’s relative wage theory of 
nominal rigidity is more suited for the unionized European economies, than for the 
United States, where the union sector is much smaller. In this context, it is also of 
some interest to note that Keynes’s own thoughts on nominal wage rigidity appear to 
be based on the experience of the United Kingdom in the 1920s,
13 when unions 
played a much more important role than has ever been the case in the United States.  
 
D. Reduced wage competition from the unemployed 
Wage rigidity would not arise if unemployed workers tried to underbid the 
employed ones, and if firms hired underbidders. According to Solow [1990, p. 38], 
however, the absence of underbidding is a key stylized fact that ought to be accounted 
for in models of unemployment. In 1991 and 1998 we asked firms the following:  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
about wage cuts to be very relevant. However, the comparison is complicated by the fact that the 
questions differ somewhat between years. The question on the top of Table 4, stressing the role of 
inter-firm wage relations, is the one we used in 1998. The question that we used in 1991, taken from 
Blinder and Choi [1990, p. 1006], stresses the role of wage relativities more generally.  
13 Keynes’s relative wage explanation for nominal wage rigidity is often traced to Keynes [1936, p. 14]. 
But Keynes [1925] is an earlier publication, which discusses British coal-miners’ resistance to wage 




  Does your firm presently have external job applicants who offer to work for 
less than the going wage for employees with the same qualifications and 
experience? (The question should be answered even if your firm presently has 
no vacancies and if local union or collective bargaining contracts prevent these 
people from being hired.) 
 
In 1991 we found that underbidding was in fact not uncommon. Ten percent of firms 
replied that they presently encountered underbidding blue-collar workers, and 13.6 
percent did the same for white-collar workers. We also asked about underbidding in 
the past, and found a similar pattern. In 1991 43.5 percent had previously encountered 
underbidding blue-collar workers, and 52.3 percent had encountered underbidding 
white-collar workers.
14 Yet, as predicted by efficiency wage theory, firms always or 
nearly always rejected underbidders. Managers responded that hiring underbidders 
would violate their internal wage policy, and that they considered underbidders to 
have inferior skills.  
In 1998, when unemployment was much higher, we expected to find that 
underbidding had got more common. However, we found exactly the opposite – wage 
competition had got much less common. Only three percent of firms reported that 
they presently encountered underbidding blue-collar workers, and 5.2 percent 
reported underbidding white-collar workers. We also asked about underbidding in the 
past, during the crisis of the 1990s, and found that the percentages had dropped 
significantly to 25.7 and 28.4, respectively.  
  It is easy to think of reasons why underbidding ought to be uncommon in a 
welfare state, where most unemployed gain (as already discussed) relatively little 
from acquiring a job. This explains why an adverse unemployment shock is unlikely 
to lead to very intensified wage competition. It may also explain why underbidding 
                                                        
14 For further details, see Agell and Lundborg [1995]. Bewley [1995] reports US evidence that 
underbidding does occur, but that firms do not appear to exploit the situation. For experimental results 




appears to be more frequent among white collar workers than among blue collar 
workers, as the former have lower replacement rates. But it does not explain why 
underbidding appears to have got less intense between 1991-98.  
To explain the reduced intensity of wage competition, we are left with the 
conjecture that the circumstances of a severe macroeconomic shock discourage job 
search. In times when firms reduce their workforce, applying for a new job might not 
appear to be a worthwhile activity. As an illustration of the extent of job destruction that 
occurred during the crisis, many firms reported that they had reduced employment quite 
substantially since 1990. Sixteen firms (10.4 percent) answered that they had reduced 
employment by more than 50 percent, while another 41 firms (26.6 percent) had reduced 
employment with up to 50 percent. In this context it is also important to note that 
Swedish job security requires a firm to recall laid-off workers before it can choose among 
other job-seekers. Thus, even as the business cycle situation improves, an underbidder 
has little prospect of jumping the queue outside a firm that has started to hire.  
 
E. A summing up 
At least since the discussion among the members of the Committee of 
Economists, economists have argued about the relative importance of the union wage 
contract, the generosity of the welfare system, and considerations of fairness and relative 
pay in explaining downward rigidity of money wages. Our analysis suggests, though, that 
it would be wrong to view these factor as mutually exclusive. The Swedish nominal wage 
floor appears to be of exceptional durability, not because of the strength of any single 
factor, but because of the compound influences from fairness norms that assign a large 
weight to wage relativities that are external to the firm, collective bargaining institutions 




safety net that insures people against a large part of the income loss in case of 
unemployment.  
A finding which we have not seen documented before is that active wage 
competition from the unemployed appears to have got less intense when it was needed 
the most, during and after a sharp macroeconomic contraction. Whether this is a general 
characteristic of all severe recessions, or whether it is a characteristic which is specific to 
our sample, remains to be seen. It seems appropriate to conclude this section with the 
customary call for additional research.  
 
IV. Work morale and the business cycle 
An implication common to all efficiency wage models is that outside 
opportunities affect effort on the job. In particular, this class of models predicts that there 
ought to be a positive link between unemployment and effort. In 1991 a great number of 
Swedish managers accepted this basic premise. When we asked the hypothetical question 
how they thought that an increase in the local unemployment rate would affect the effort 
of their employees, no less than ninety percent answered that effort would increase.  
If these prior beliefs make sense, employees ought to work harder in 1998, 
when unemployment was so much higher than in 1991. This is precisely what we 
find. In both years we asked “How common is it for your employees to provide less 
effort than expected, i.e. to shirk?”. In 1991 most managers did not regard sub-
standard performance as very common. But when we asked the same question in 1998 
51.6 percent of managers reported that sub-standard performance had got less 
common, 34.2 percent reported that it was as common as before, while 14.2 percent 
reported that it had got more common. Figure 1 indicates a strong business cycle 




This response is compatible with both a fair wage and a shirking interpretation 
of the efficiency wage model. According to the fair wage model, higher 
unemployment stimulates effort since workers become more “grateful” to be 
employed [Akerlof, 1982]. According to the shirking model, higher unemployment 
increases effort, as it raises the economic penalty of being caught as a shirker [Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984]. The positive relation between effort and unemployment is also 
consistent with the observation of Bewley [1998, p. 479] that firms exploit recessions 
to get rid of their least productive employees.
15  
A noteworthy finding of previous field surveys is that all report support for 
theories that emphasize fairness and morale as important factors in explaining effort 
and wage rigidity.
16 However, there is very little support for the shirking model,
17 the 
model that has attracted most attention in the theoretical literature. Managers do not 
appear to view punishment threats as good motivators. In 1991 our managers replied 
that employees who were repeatedly caught shirking were punished by a simple 
verbal rebuke, and that penalties with an economic content were very rare; see Agell 
and Lundborg [1995]. If the Shapiro-Stiglitz model really is correct in portraying 
workers as deriving utility from shirking, such lax penalties ought to be accompanied 
by massive incentive problems, no matter the extent of monitoring.  
                                                        
15 However, this would require our firms to find a way to circumvent the seniority provisions of 
Swedish job security legislation, discussed below.  
16 Blinder and Choi [1990], Campbell and Kamlani [1997], and Bewley [1998] all report evidence 
suggesting that there is a strong negative relation between work morale and unilateral wage cuts, but a 
much weaker link between work morale and wage levels. Because Swedish firms are not allowed to cut 
pay unilaterally, our own survey includes no questions about the relation between unilateral wage cuts 
and effort. Instead, we simply asked how managers assessed the likelihood that employees reduced 
effort if the firm upheld a wage structure that was considered to be unfair. While most firms 
acknowledged that an unfair wage structure might lead to reduced effort, few firms seemed to believe 
that the relationship was a very strong one. This pattern applies in both 1991 and 1998.  
17 See Campbell and Kamlani [1997] and Bewley [1998]. As noted by Malcolmson [1998], however, 
all field surveys have targeted their questions specifically at the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, where there is 
a very simple relation between effort, wages, and unemployment. There are more elaborate shirking 




In 1998 we borrowed a question from Campbell and Kamlani [1997], and 
asked managers to assess the importance of four factors in boosting the effort of their 
employees: close supervision, high wages, good management-worker relationships, 
and high unemployment. Table 5 reports the percentage of managers that rank each of 
the factors as the most important one, and a comparison with the results for the U.S. 
managers surveyed by Campbell and Kamlani. In both surveys the not-so-neoclassical 
sounding ”good management-worker relationships” comes out much ahead. Managers 
in both countries also appear to assign the least weight to close supervision, a factor 
emphasized in the shirking literature.
18 But Swedish managers appear to attribute a 
much less important motivating role to high wages. It seems likely that this reflects 
the much higher unionization rates in Sweden, and the less individualistic nature of 
industrial relations and wage bargaining. Swedish managers have probably less 
discretion than U.S. ones in designing incentive compatible wage hierarchies.  
In field surveys, semantics is important, as are framing effects. To reduce the 
risk that the choice between ”good relationships” and ”close supervision” is biased by 
the fact that the former sounds so much nicer, our 1998 survey asked managers to list, 
in their own words, the factors that they judged to be most important in motivating 
their employees. Although some stressed the importance of incentives, in the form of 
productivity-related pay, and career tracks, most managers emphasized other incentive 
devices. They answered that their employees ought to be given stimulating work 
assignments, and to feel involved in decision-making. Managers also stressed that it 
was important that all employees felt noticed and trusted, and provided with 
continuous feedback and appreciation. Some managers pointed to the benefits from 
                                                        
18 In our Swedish survey 61 percent of managers indicated that close supervision was the least 




creating a friendly atmosphere, and one answered that people work hard as long as 
they have fun.  
These responses are practically identical to those given by the U.S. managers 
interviewed by Bewley [1998]. Both Swedish and U.S. managers seem to ascribe a 
surprisingly important motivational role to psychological and sociological factors. 
This emphasis on what appears to be essentially nonmaterial incentives 
(“appreciation”, “demonstration of trust,” etc.) is not easy to understand from the 
perspective of standard neoclassical effort models. However, it does seem to 
corroborate some of the implications from recent psychological models of game 
theory. In the well-known bilateral fairness model of Rabin [1993] players care about 
material pay-off, but also about intentions.
19 Most importantly, Rabin’s model 
incorporates the possibility that an individual is willing to sacrifice her own material 
well-being to assist an individual who is perceived to be kind. From this perspective 
“appreciation” and “demonstration of trust” might be interpreted as management’s 
way of signaling their kindness and good intentions to their employees.  
 
V. Unemployment persistence and job security legislation 
Why is European unemployment so high? A popular view emphasizes the role 
of adverse labor market institutions in increasing the natural rate of unemployment. 
But as noted by several commentators, this view is not easy to reconcile with the 
observation that these institutions were already present in the 1960s, when European 
unemployment used to be very low. A potentially more promising line of explanation 
focuses on the interaction between adverse macroeconomic shocks and labor market 




generous unemployment benefits slow down the equilibrating force that pulls the 
economy back towards the natural rate after an adverse macroeconomic shock. In a 
recent study Blanchard and Wolfers [1999] show that an econometric model 
incorporating aggregate shocks and indicators of labor market institutions appears to 
explain most of the evolution of unemployment over time, and across countries, in a 
panel of 20 OECD countries.  
  Our microeconomic panel sheds light on how one prominent labor market 
institution, job security legislation, interacts with aggregate shocks. After the 
immediate crisis in 1991-93, when manufacturing employment decreased by more 
than 20 percent, production recovered strongly. Between 1993 to 1998 production 
grew, spurred by a huge depreciation of the Krona in 1992, at an annual rate of nine 
percent. But at the same time the number of manufacturing employees grew at an 
annual rate of only one percent. Can this period of “jobless growth” be due to the 
provisions of Swedish job security legislation?
20  
We confronted managers with a number of statements about job security. In 
both 1991 and 1998 a majority of managers (58 percent in 1991, 51.3 percent in 1998) 
indicated strong support
21 for the proposition that the commitments associated with 
job security made them careful in screening job seekers. In both years a majority (56.7 
percent in 1991, 54.5 percent in 1998) also indicated strong support for the 
                                                                                                                                                               
19 For other recent approaches to fairness and reciprocity, see Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger [1998], and Falk and Fischbacher [1999].  
20 According to the OECD employment protection index, Sweden has traditionally belonged in a group 
of countries with tough regulations. In addition to requiring severance pay and advance notification, 
Swedish law requires that layoffs must follow a strict seniority principle.  
21 By “strong” we mean that a respondent answers with a numerical score of at least seven on our 
integer scale from 1 to 9. In interpreting our results it should be noted that the future of job security in 
Sweden has been much debated during the 1990s. To reduce the risk that our respondents provided us 
with strategic answers, accommodating the views of organized business interests, our questions on job 
security were of a detailed and concrete nature, emphasizing mechanisms discussed in e.g. Bertola 
[1990] and Bentolila and Bertola [1990]. An indication that strategic response bias might be less of a 
problem follows from the fact that the average scores on most of our job security questions were about 




proposition that job security lowered their propensity to hire people in an economic 
upturn, and increased the propensity to rely on overtime hours. In 1998 a substantial 
minority (36.4 percent) indicated strong support for the proposition that the seniority 
principle inhibited layoffs in an economic downturn, because firms otherwise faced 
the risk of having to layoff competent, recently employed, workers.  
These responses are well in line with the theoretical analyses of Bentolila and 
Bertola [1990] and Bertola [1990] on how strict job security ought to affect 
employment dynamics over the course of a regular business cycle: job security 
reduces hirings during an upswing, and firings during a downturn. The views of our 
managers are also perfectly consistent with the aggregate evidence of Blanchard and 
Wolfers [1999], according to which job security is a factor that slows down the 
recovery of labor demand after an adverse macroeconomic shock.  
In Sweden, as in many other countries with stringent laws, there are flexible 
arrangements open for a firm that wants to avoid the job protection that comes with a 
permanent employment contract. Here we note an interesting difference between 
years. A far greater share of managers replied that job security for permanent 
employees boosted the use of trial employment in 1998 than in 1991; see Table 6. 
This is consistent with the fact that the number of employees on temporary contracts 
rose substantially during the 1990s. It also fits with the view that a more unstable 
environment increases firms’ demand for flexibility, and penalizes job seekers in 
search of a protected, tenured job.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
Subject to the usual caveat that survey evidence must be interpreted with 




light on a number of important issues. We document the virtual absence of nominal 
wage cuts during several consecutive years characterized by very low inflation and 
quite high unemployment. The downward stickiness of money wages appears to 
depend on a number of interacting factors, including institutional aspects of the wage 
contract, the social insurance provided by the welfare state, and employees’ concerns 
about relative wages and fairness, along the lines of Keynes [1936, p. 14]. The 
existence of a nominal wage floor implies that real wages become more rigid as the 
inflation rate goes to zero. As suggested by Tobin [1972], some inflation might then 
be needed to grease the wheels of the labor market. As the Riksbank’s main objective 
is to secure price stability, this appears to raise some disturbing questions about the 
Swedish labor market’s ability to cope with future, macroeconomic shocks.  
In this respect Sweden is probably not very different from most members of 
the European monetary union. A common argument of those in charge of European 
monetary policy is that the trade-off between price stability and unemployment can be 
improved by institutional reforms that promote wage flexibility. But to the extent that 
we are right in concluding that fairness and workers’ concerns about relative wages 
are important reasons for nominal rigidity, institutional reform may accomplish little. 
Developing models of how social norms of fairness interact with the legal constraints 
emphasized in the political debate seems like an important topic for future research on 
nominal wage rigidity.  
The sharp increase in Swedish unemployment also allows us to evaluate some 
specific theories of effort and unemployment. We present substantial evidence that 
unemployment raises effort and eliminates substandard performance, an implication 
common to many efficiency wage models. But we still conclude that much recent 




convinced as the U.S. managers interviewed by e.g. Campbell and Kamlani [1997] 
and Bewley [1998] that the shirking model misses crucial aspects of reality. Finally, 
we present new evidence on unemployment persistence. In line with 
macroeconometric work emphasizing the interaction of shocks and labor market 
institutions in explaining persistent European unemployment, our respondents point at 
Swedish job security legislation as an important factor that has limited new hires 
during the recovery after the immediate crisis.  
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Table 1. “Assume that the management in the midst of an acute crisis suggests an 
identical percentage wage cut for all employees in the firm, so that the wage 
hierarchy is retained. What share of the jobs do you believe must be at stake if 
the proposed cut is to be accepted by employees.” 
 
 




Percentage of firms; 
1991 sample 
 
Percentage of firms; 
1998 sample 
 
% 50 £  
 
 
  20.26 
  
  13.91 
 
% 100 ... 50 < <  
 
 
  49.67 
  
  56.95 
 
100 % (closing down) 
 
 
  22.22 
 
  19.21 
 
Not even a threat of 
closing down is enough 
 
 
    7.84 
 















Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of binary probit models for subjectively 
perceived wage cut resistance (1991 survey)  
 
 






























   (0.641) 
-2.065** 
   (0.772) 
-2.067** 



















No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of firms 
where dependent 
variable takes the 
value one 
 
51    51    51    46 
No. of firms 
 
174  174  174  158 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is described in the text. White collar share is the 
share of the firm’s workforce that the manager classifies as white collar 
workers, Size is the total number of employees in the firm, Unionization rate is 
the share of a firm’s employees that are union members. All regressions in 
columns 1-5 include a set of industry dummy variables (not shown). Because 
of missing values, the number of observations differ across specifications. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (** denotes significance at the five percent 







Table 3. ”How common is it for your employees to compare their wage with the 






Percentage of managers that identify (internal OR 
external) wage comparisons as common or very 
common 
 








































Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”very 
uncommon”, and 9 for ”very common”. In the third column we show the 







Table 4. ”According to some academic researchers the reason that nominal wages 
seldom fall is that wage relativities might be altered. Employees protect their 
position in the wage hierarchy, and they resist a wage cut because they are 
afraid that they will fall behind employees in other firms. How important is 









Percentage of managers 
that consider the theory as 


















Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”unimportant”, 
and 9 for ”very important”. In the third column we show the percentage of 










Table 5. Percentage of managers in Sweden and the USA that rank each of the factors 






Percentage of managers that rank the factor as most 









Campbell and Kamlani 
survey of US managers 
 
 




  3.24 
 
  6.13 
High wages 
 




81.62  58.91 
High unemployment 
 
  9.19  10.75 
 
Note: The numbers in the third column are adapted from Campbell and Kamlani 
[1997, p. 775] as follows. First, while Campbell and Kamlani report results for 
three types of employees, we just compute the average. Second, Campbell and 
Kamlani include a fifth factor in their comparison, ”good working conditions”, 
which we eliminate. We re-scale the percentages reported by Campbell and 








Table 6. ”Indicate to what extent you agree with the following proposition: Job 
security legislation makes your firm more prone to offer flexible short-term 










Percentage of managers 
indicating strong support 

















Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”no support”, 
and 9 for ”very strong support”. In the third column we show the percentage 










Figure 1. ”How common is it for your employees to provide less effort 
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